

Glass Lewis Policies Affecting Director Elections

As of December 2025

Circumstance	Glass Lewis Policy	Targeted Directors
	Board Governance	
Director Independence	 If a board is less than two-thirds independent, Glass Lewis typically recommends voting against some of the inside and/or affiliated directors in order to satisfy the two-thirds threshold 	Individual Director
	 An exception is made for controlled companies 	
Director Performance	• Director has failed to attend a minimum of 75% of board and committee meetings, has a pattern of belatedly filing Form(s) 4 or 5, serves as CEO of a company where a serious and material financial restatement has occurred after the CEO had certified the pre-restatement financial statements, or has received two against recommendations from Glass Lewis for identical reasons within the prior year at different companies	Individual Director
Overboarding	 Serves as a director and an executive officer (other than executive chair) of any public company while serving on more than one other public company board 	Individual Director
	 Serves as an executive chair of the board of any public company while serving on more than two other public company boards 	
	 Serves on more than five public company boards in total 	
	• Serves in an executive role only at a SPAC while serving on more than five public company boards in total	
	• Glass Lewis will not recommend against overcommitted directors at the companies where they serve as an executive	
Conflicts of	A CFO serves on the board	Individual Director
Interest	 A director, or his/her immediately family member, provides material consulting or other material professional services to the company, including legal and financial services 	
	• A director, or his/her immediate family member, engages in transactions with the company amounting to more than \$50,000	
	• CEOs or other top executives of two different companies serve on each other's boards	
	 On a case-to-case basis, interlocking relationships, such as interlocks with close family members of executives or within group companies 	
	 All directors who served on the board when a poison pill with a term longer than one year was adopted without shareholder approval during the prior year 	

^{*} Reflects new or revised policy for 2026.



Circumstance	Glass Lewis Policy	Targeted Directors
	 On a case-to-case basis, all directors who extend the term of a poison pill by one year or less in two consecutive years without seeking shareholder approval or providing adequate justification 	
	 On a case-to-case basis, all Nominating/Governance committee members when the board adopts a poison pill with a term of one year or less without seeking shareholder approval or providing adequate justification 	
Board Gender Diversity	• Companies within the Russell 3000 index that are not at least 30 percent gender diverse	Nominating/Governance Committee Chair with a
	 An exception may be made if the board provides a sufficient rationale or plan to address the lack of diversity on the board, including a timeline to appoint gender diverse directors (generally by the next annual meeting) 	"For Your Attention" flag
Board Underrepresented	• Companies in the Russell 1000 index with fewer than one director from an underrepresented community on the board	Nominating/Governance Committee Chair with a "For Your Attention" flag
Community Diversity	 An exception may be made if the board provides a sufficient rationale or plan to address the lack of diversity on the board, including a timeline to appoint additional directors from an underrepresented community (generally by the next annual meeting) 	
	 "Underrepresented community" is defined as an individual who self-identifies, as disclosed in the company proxy statements, as Black, African American, North African, Middle Eastern, Hispanic, Latino, Asian, Pacific Islander, Native American, Native Hawaiian, or Alaskan Native, or who self-identifies as a member of the LGBTQIA+ community 	
Disclosure of Director Diversity and Skills	 Companies in the Russell 1000 index that have not provided any disclosure of individual or aggregate racial/ethnic minority demographic information of directors 	Nominating/Governance Committee Chair with a "For Your Attention"
	 Companies in the Russell 1000 index that have not provided any disclosure in all of the following: 	flag
	• The board's current percentage of racial/ethnic diversity	
	• Whether the board's definition of diversity explicitly includes gender and/or race/ethnicity	
	 Whether the board has adopted a policy requiring women and minorities to be included in the initial pool of candidates when selecting new director nominees 	

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Circumstance	Glass Lewis Policy	Targeted Directors
	Board skills disclosure	
	 Companies listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange that do not provide board diversity statistics required by the SEC and NASDAQ's new listing rules 	
Board Accountability for Environmental and Social	 Companies that have not properly managed or mitigated material environmental or social risks to the detriment of shareholder value, or when such mismanagement has threatened shareholder value 	Entire Board, Audit Committee and/or Individual Director
Performance	 Determination based on careful review of the situation, its effect on shareholder value, as well as any corrective action or other response made by the company 	
Board Oversight of Environmental and Social Issues	• Companies in the Russell 1000 index that fail to provide explicit disclosure concerning the board's role in overseeing environmental and social issues	Entire Board, Nominating/Governance Committee Chair and/or
	 Documents examined in the determination of whether directors maintain a meaningful level of oversight and accountability for a company's material environmental and social risks include committee charters and other governing documents, in which these responsibilities should be formally designated and codified 	Individual Director (on a case-by-case basis)
Board Oversight of Artificial Intelligence	 If an AI-related incident occurs and there is evidence that insufficient oversight and/or management of AI technologies caused material harm to shareholders 	Individual Director (on a case-by-case basis)
Cyber Risk Oversight	• If cyber-attacks have caused significant harm to shareholders and the board's oversight, response or disclosure is found to be insufficient or not provided	Individual Director (on a case-by-case basis)
	• If companies fail to provide periodic updates about the status of a material cybersecurity incident	
Problematic Governance Structures at Newly-Public Companies	• The company has completed an IPO, spin-off, or direct listing within the past year and the Board has approved overly restrictive governing documents. Measures evaluated include:	Committee Members
	 The adoption of anti-takeover provisions such as a poison pill or classified board 	
	 Supermajority vote requirements to amend governing documents 	
	• Exclusive forum or fee-shifting provisions	
	 Inability of shareholders to call special meetings or act by written consent 	

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 Ability of shareholders to remove directors without cause 	
 Presence of evergreen provisions in the company's equity compensation arrangements 	
 Presence of a multi-class structure which does not afford common shareholders voting power that is aligned with their economic interest 	
• If, preceding an IPO or a SPAC combination becoming publicly traded, the company adopted a multi-class share structure or an anti-takeover provision, Glass Lewis will generally recommend voting against all members of the board who served at the time of the IPO if the board:	
 Does not commit to submitting these provisions to a shareholder vote at the first shareholder meeting 	
 Does not provide for a reasonable sunset of these provisions, generally 3 to 5 years in the case of a classified board or poison pill, or 7 years in the case of a multi-class share structure 	
• The board adopts term or age limits, and waives these term or age limits for two or more consecutive years, unless a compelling rationale is provided for why the board proposes to waive this rule	Nominating/Governance Committee Chair
• The company excludes a shareholder proposal seeking a reduced special meeting right by means of ratifying a management proposal that is materially different from the shareholder proposal	Nominating/Governance Committee Chair
Shareholder Rights	
On a case-by-case basis: The company adopts a Net Operating Loss (NOL) poison pill without shareholder approval within the prior twelve months	Entire Board
 A closed-end or business development company relied on a control share statute as a defense mechanism to a public buyout offer in the prior year, absent a compelling rationale as to why offer was not in the best interest of shareholders 	Nominating/Governance Chair
 A board seeks shareholder approval of a forum selection clause pursuant to a bundled bylaw amendment rather than as a separate proposal, and/or bundles disparate proposals into a single proposal 	Nominating/Governance Committee Chair
• The board adopts a "fee-shifting" bylaw that requires plaintiffs who sue the company and fail to receive a judgment in their favor pay the legal expenses of the company	Nominating/Governance Committee Members
The board plans to hold a virtual-only shareholder meeting and the company does not provide such disclosure	Nominating/Governance Committee Members
	 compensation arrangements Presence of a multi-class structure which does not afford common shareholders voting power that is aligned with their economic interest If, preceding an IPO or a SPAC combination becoming publicly traded, the company adopted a multi-class share structure or an anti-takeover provision, Glass Lewis will generally recommend voting against all members of the board who served at the time of the IPO if the board: Does not commit to submitting these provisions to a shareholder vote at the first shareholder meeting Does not provide for a reasonable sunset of these provisions, generally 3 to 5 years in the case of a classified board or poison pill, or 7 years in the case of a multi-class share structure The board adopts term or age limits, and waives these term or age limits for two or more consecutive years, unless a compelling rationale is provided for why the board proposes to waive this rule The company excludes a shareholder proposal seeking a reduced special meeting right by means of ratifying a management proposal that is materially different from the shareholder proposal Shareholder Rights On a case-by-case basis: The company adopts a Net Operating Loss (NOL) poison pill without shareholder approval within the prior twelve months A closed-end or business development company relied on a control share statute as a defense mechanism to a public buyout offer in the prior year, absent a compelling rationale as to why offer was not in the best interest of shareholders A board seeks shareholder approval of a forum selection clause pursuant to a bundled bylaw amendment rather than as a separate proposal, and/or bundles disparate proposals into a single proposal The board adopts a "fee-shifting" bylaw that requires plaintiffs who sue the company and fail to receive a judgment in their favor pay the legal expenses of the company The board plans to hold a virtual-only shareholder me

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Circumstance	Glass Lewis Policy	Targeted Directors
Mandatory Arbitration Provisions*	The board adopts a mandatory arbitration provision and does not provide sufficient rationale and disclosure	Governance Committee Members

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Circumstance	Glass Lewis	Targeted Directors
	Board Governance	
Problematic Nominating/ Governance Committee Structures	 The board fails to address shareholder concerns following majority approval of a shareholder proposal relating to shareholder rights, such as those seeking a declassified board structure, a majority vote standard for director elections, or the right to call a special meeting 	Nominating/Governance Committee Chair and/or Committee Members
	• A shareholder resolution is excluded from the meeting agenda in the absence of SEC approval to exclude such a resolution	
	• The Nominating/Governance Committee chair is not independent	
	• The board contains fewer than five directors or more than 20 directors	
	 The board has a multi-class share structure and unequal voting rights and the company does not provide for a reasonable sunset of the multi-class share structure 	
	 The Company provides inadequate related party transaction disclosure for two or more consecutive years 	
	 The board seeks shareholder approval of a forum selection clause pursuant to a bundled bylaw amendment rather than as a separate proposal subject to shareholder approval 	
	 The board adopts other provisions, without shareholder approval, that may inhibit the ability of shareholders to nominate directors or vote on other matters material to shareholder rights 	
	 The board fails to make other egregious governance-related disclosures 	

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	Compensation	
Compensation Committee Performance	 On a case-by-case basis: board implements egregious compensation practices such as the approval of large on-off payments, inappropriate and unjustified use of discretion, or sustained poor pay for performance practices 	Compensation Committee Chair and/or Committee Members
	 The board fails to address shareholder concerns following majority shareholder rejection of the say-on-pay proposal in the previous year 	
	 On a case-by-case basis: The board fails to respond adequately to a previous SOP proposal that received less than 80 percent support of votes cast 	
	 The Compensation Committee has recently practiced or approved problematic pay practices, such as option repricing or option backdating 	
	 The Compensation Committee allows excessive perquisites and benefits 	
	 The Compensation Committee grants outsized awards (so- called "mega-grants") and the awards present concerns such as excessive quantum, lack of sufficient performance conditions, and/or are excessively dilute, among others 	
	 Other egregious practices, such as the payment of performance-based compensation despite goals not being attained 	
Option Backdating	The company grants backdated options to an executive who is also a director	Individual Director, Directors who approved or allowed the backdating, Audit Committee Members
Spring-loading and bullet-dodging	The company engages in spring-loading or bullet dodging	Individual Director, Directors who benefited, Compensation Committee Members

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	Audit & Risk Oversight	
Problematic Audit- Related Practices	 The board has backdated options, there are a lack of internal controls in place, there was a resulting restatement, and disclosures indicate a lack of documentation 	Audit Committee Chair and/or Committee Members
	 Audit Committee lacks proper financial expertise, has less than three members, did not meet at least four times during the year 	
	Audit Committee member is overboarded or not independent	
	 Audit Committee has received undisclosed or excessively high or low fees, or non-audit fees include fees for tax services for senior executives of the company 	
	 Auditor ratification fails to be placed on the ballot for shareholder approval 	
	 Auditor has resigned and reported that a Section 10A letter has been issued 	
	• Company experiences material accounting fraud, conducts financial restatements as a result of fraud, fails to file financial reports in a timely fashion, violates FCPA, lacks sufficient transparency in its financial statement, or fails to correct material weaknesses year-over-year.	
Material Weaknesses	 The company reported a material weakness that has not yet been corrected does not disclose its remediation plan to a material weakness or the weakness has been ongoing for over a year without any disclosures detailing the company's progress in remediating the situation 	Audit Committee Members (who served since last annual meeting)
Risk Management Failures	 The Company has disclosed a sizable loss or writedown, and the company's board-level risk committee's poor oversight contributed to the loss 	Individual Director
	Climate	
Climate-Related Issues	• The company is one whose GHG emissions represent a financially material risk** and its climate-related disclosures, in line with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosure, are absent or significantly lacking	Individual Director
	** ** Such companies include ASX 200, CAC 40, DAX40, Euronext 100, FTSE 100, FTSE MIB, Hang Seng, Ibex 35, IBRX 50, JSE Top 40, KOPSI 200, Nikkei 225, OMNX40, S&P 500, S&P Europe 350, S&P/NZX 50, TSX 60	

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